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Abstract
Transit systems and buses, in particular; generally suffer from severe financial
problems that affect their sustainability and levels of service. In an attempt to revive
these svstems, public authorities have recently moved toward more private sector par-
ticipation, which could improve cost efficiency. This participation can take different
forms depending on the roles of each sector in the provision and production of public
transport. This article examines the different models for private sector participation in
the provision of mass transit services, describing their respective benefits and disad-
vantages for both transit providers and users. Focus is, however; given to one specific
strategy-s-competitive tendering-because of its successful application worldwide and
its suitability to the case study context. Competitive tender structuring elements that
relate to determining the size of the contract to be tendered as well as the allocation of
routes among bid packages ("service design") is discussed in particular. A sound
methodology for assessing bid packages of routes is developed and then applied for the
case study of Beirut, Lebanon.
Introduction
Public transport systems and buses, in particular, represenl the most effi-
cient modes of transport in high-density urban areas. With their widespread
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networks, frequent service, reasonable fares, and capability of carrying large
numbers of passengers, they theoretically best serve the three objectives of
mobility, social equity, and congestion reduction. However, in many develop-
ing countries, these systems often suffer from considerable deficits, low qual-
ity of service, and unreliable operation (Yagi 1994). Great efforts are needed
to revive those failing systems, and in many cities around the world, more pri-
vate sector involvement appears to be the best way to achieve this.
In fact, many researchers consider that public organizations are less effi-
cient, suffer from strong labor constraints, and lack sufficient initiative
(Karlaftis 1998). They also view the private sector as being "more sensitive to
economic incentives, more flexible and adoptive to changing market needs and
structure, and more in tune with customer needs" (Karlaftis 1998).
Other researchers, however, claim that it is not the change in the operator
itself that would possibly lead to cost savings and better operation, but the com-
petition associated with the private sector's participation. Privatization, or even
the threat of it, makes both public and private operators more competitive, push-
ing them to reduce their labor costs and improve their service levels
(McCullough et al. 1998). A successful marriage of competition and regulation
appears capable of substantially improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
public transport systems.
Private sector participation can take different forms and strategies, each
one having specific dimensions relating to provision and production of mass
transit. In the following sections, the extent of and models for private sector par-
ticipation are described and discussed.
Organizational Models for Mass Transit
The regulatory forms of mass transport services include, as suggested by
Yagi and Mantell, public and private monopolies, deregulation, regulated com-
petition, and competitive tendering strategies (Yagi 1994; Mantell 1993). Each
of these models has advantages and disadvantages, and each might be suitable
for specific environments based on political, economical, and social condi-
tions. In the subsequent sections, these structures will be briefly introduced in
terms of their respective benefits and disadvantages, and special attention will
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be given to the last option, which will be the one adopted in the illustrative
case study.
Public and Private Monopolies
Public monopoly gives one public operator the exclusive rights for
designing, owning, and operating all transit services. without any competition
from other operators. This single operator could also be a privately owned
company (in which case the setup is called "private monopoly") that works
under regulatory rules set by the transit authority (Halcrow Fox 2000).
Theoretically, public monopoly enables the government to directly imple-
ment its accessibility and social equity concerns through the public operator. It
creates a well-coordinated system that is able, with the government support, to
expand its services without fear of financial risks (Yagi 1994). However, many
countries cannot afford high subsidies, and without this financial support, such
systems may not be able to return sufficient profits for the expansion and
renewal of transit services (Transportation Research Board 2001).
As for private monopolies, they can provide consistency and coordina-
tion in the production of transit services, can benefit from possible
economies of scale, and could eliminate the need for government subsidy.
The main disadvantage is that monopolists tend to abuse the exclusive rights
to maximize their revenues by increasing fares and providing lower quality
services (Yagi 1994).
tlnrequiated Systems
Also called "open market" (Halcrow Fox 2000), an unregulated market
presents no restrictions on transit operators, except those related to safety con-
cerns, environmental issues, vehicle maintenance, and general business and
traffic laws. Toward this end of organizational strategies, competition between
different operators exists in the market, particularly to attract more riders and
increase revenues. This competition benefits the whole mass transport system
because it pushes operators to reduce costs, increase benefits, and accordingly
invest in expanding and ameliorating services. Riders also benefit from lower
fares (particularly in high-demand areas), a large variety of options, and possi-
bly a more frequent operation (Salvucci et al. 1997).
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Deregulation, however, has many drawbacks and disadvantages. For
instance, operators may suffer from "unfair competition, predatory practices
and coercive or threatening tactics" (Salvucci et al. 1997). Riders also suffer
because of the absence of any fare and service coordination, as well as respect-
ed schedules. Finally, with the preferred use of smaller vehicles at higher fre-
quencies, congestion and environmental problems seem much more aggravat-
ed when adopting a similar strategy (Yagi 1994; Salvucci et al. 1997).
Regulated Competition
This system preserves the competitive aspect of deregulated markets, with
additional rules regarding fares, level of service, entry to the system (through
a license), and operated routes (Won 1995). These rules could enable the gov-
ernment to create an integrated network with sufficient coordination between
different operators. Entry restrictions also set the stage for profitable services
by eliminating destructive competition and benefit traffic conditions by limit-
ing the number of transit operators and accordingly reducing congestion prob-
lems. The main disadvantages relate to possible preferential treatment that
could be given by the regulator to stronger operators, need for continuous fare
adjustments to maintain sufficient levels of profitability, and inability of the
system, without public support, to maintain services in low demand areas
(Salvucci et al. 1997; Mantell 1993).
Competitive Tendering
Competitive tendering (contracting out) falls midway between public or
private monopolies and full deregulation techniques (Scurfield 1990). Baldwin
and Cave defined it as "the allocation [by government agency] of a protected
or exclusive right to exploit or carry out an activity such that consumers or the
public gain an advantage-for example, an efficiently produced and competi-
tively priced service" (Toner 2001). It enables the introduction of competition
for the market, while keeping certain levels of public control over fares, service
quality, and coordination between different operators.
Competitive tendering has been recently widely applied in many cities
around the world, such as London, Copenhagen, and Stockholm. The experi-
ences revealed many benefits in as far as cost savings, improved quality of ser-
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nee, network expansion, congestion reduction, amelioration in safety and
environmental measures, and enhanced customer satisfaction (International
Transit Studies Program 1998). In London, for example, 10 years after the ini-
tiation of the competitive tendering process, operating costs dropped by 47 per-
cent due to lower labor costs and more efficient operation. Moreover, operated
vehicle-kilometers expanded by 29 percent, and ridership levels increased by a
very meaningful 5 percent (more than a 20% drop in other areas of the UK)
(Bayliss 1997). This success is, however, greatly dependent on a decisive and
close monitoring of the performance of each operator. This would be best
achieved when an authority that is completely independent from any political
pressure (i.e., not the public operator) organizes the tender.
Competitive tendering requires a number of transport policies and legisla-
tive reforms to successfully achieve its objectives. Moreover, the transit authori-
ty needs to decide on two major aspects of the tendering process (Toner 2001):
• Who bears the revenue risk/what type of contract to adopt?
• How to design the contract?
Type Of Contract
The adopted contract can be a cost, revenue, or shared contract. In cost
contracts, the operator specifies in the bid the full cost required in exchange for
provided services and which will be received irrespective of collected fares.
Revenues are transferred to the transit authority that bears the revenue risks and
is responsible for controlling the adherence of the contractor to the service lev-
els cited in the contract (Scurfield 1990; Shaw 1996).
Revenue contracts, on the other hand, transfer revenue risks from the tran-
sit authority to the private operator, who keeps the collected fares. In some
instances, the operator could receive additional subsidies in case the operated
routes are nonprofitable; when the opposite is true, the operator might be asked
to pay the transit authority for the "right to operate" (Scurfield 1990).
Shared contracts provide a compromise between cost and revenue con-
tracts, whereby revenue risks are equally shared by the transit authority and
private operator. This alternative is very beneficial because it creates incentives
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for both public and private parties to provide better service and become more
cost efficient (Mantell 1993).
Selecting the appropriate contract form for a specific case is not an easy
task. In fact, although revenue contracts transfer all revenue risks from the pub-
lic authority to the private operator, cost contracts could be more appropriate
when other criteria such as competition, incurred cost, incentives, and ease of
contract management are looked at (Shaw 1996). The selection should follow
a careful and detailed study of existing conditions as well as aims and capabil-
ities of the transit authority.
Competitive Tender Structuring
In every contract or competitive tender, the following issues should be
clearly specified (Halcrow Fox 2000; Wallis and Bray 2001):
• routes to be tendered;
• contract size;
• contract duration and renewal;
• fares;
• schedules;
• vehicle characteristics;
• service and safety standards;
• asset ownership and use;
• roles and responsibilities of both the regulating authority and private
sector;
• amount of control the regulating authority has over the product; and
• system integration policies (e.g., service coordination, integrated fares
and ticketing, passenger information).
Covering all the above aspects of the competitive tender falls beyond the
scope of this article. The work described in this article focuses on service
design, which will be further discussed in the next section.
Service Design
Service design involves competitive tender structuring elements that relate
to determining the size of the contract to be tendered as well as the allocation of
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routes among bid packages. "The size of the contract package is critical"
(Gwilliam 1997). In the bus industry, the minimum package size is the single
route hut could expand to cover a whole area. For a specific system, it would be
beneficial to award enough contracts to avoid reliance on a single provider and
encourage losers to bid again (Mantell 1993). Small contracts also give more
chance to smaller companies to participate in the bidding process. With fewer
routes in the package, the required financial and technical resources could be
available for a larger number of companies, leading to more competition in the
bids. InLondon, for example. the network was first contracted out on a route-by-
route basis. with the possibility of joint bids for a number of routes. The selec-
tion of single routes that were prioritized in the tendering process was based on
(World Bank 1999):
• poor financial performance,
• poor operational performance,
• likelihood of attracting competition,
• resources needed, and
• location.
A larger system would, however, allow the operator to benefit from
economies of scale and cross-subsidies, as well as the possibility to allocate
resources as per peak-hour demand (World Bank 1999). Moreover, it enables
the operator to provide a more integrated and coordinated service within the
package. However, the package size should not exceed an upper limit that
could be characterized as that beyond which fewer than three competitors are
confidently capable of participating in the bid (Halcrow Fox 2000).
In areas where capabilities of different operators are limited, a good prac-
tice would be to start by contracting out small packages that attract a wide range
of operators, and then move toward larger contracts following the growth in the
power of different competitors (Halcrow Fox 2000). A similar approach was
adopted in London where small suburban routes were the first to be opened for
tender, before larger areas were gradually introduced in the bidding process.
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Finally, one interesting approach for the selection of tendered routes was
adopted in Uzbekistan. The first routes to be put in tender were those served by
many private operators and showing a certain degree of competition. The philos-
ophy behind this approach is that more operators would be interested in obtain-
ing exclusive rights to work on these profitable routes in order to increase their
revenues. The on-the-street competition will thus be transferred to the tendering
process, leading to a decrease in the bid prices (Gwilliam et al. 2000).
Proposed Framework for Service Design in Competitive
Tendering
The research efforts described above have considered competitive tender-
ing and its applications in different cities around the world. However, they all
focused on the historical background and the implications of this organization-
al form and only marginally discussed the service design step of grouping bus
routes into bid packages. The article addresses this aspect. It proposes a flexi-
ble framework for service design that consists of:
I. generating routes (i.e., network design),
2. defining a basis for route packaging, and
3. evaluating obtained packages based on assessment criteria that reflect
system objectives.
The article's objective is not to cover all aspects of competitive tendering.
but simply to propose a systematic approach for grouping routes into contract
packages.
Generation Of Routes
The generation of routes when a bus network is put out for tender may dif-
fer from procedures commonly adopted for network design and which are
aimed basically at single monopolist operators. The bus network may need to
be completely redesigned to best serve the contracting out process. However,
this aspect is beyond the scope of this article and could constitute the basis for
interesting further research.
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Basis far Route Packaging
The second step in the framework involves investigating ways of group-
ing routes together based on a common feature. In fact, depending on the
geometry of the network, routes could be combined into packages according to
several considerations. Two such attributes are: the common terminal or the
served corridor. In the first approach. all those routes that have a common ter-
minal, or relatively close terminals, would be sorted together and tendered as
one package to be operated by a single company. This strategy enables the
operator to consolidate all of its fleet in one garage at or close to the terminal,
thus reducing the lost time spent in moving vehicles between the garage and
the terminal. It is also beneficial for the operation within the terminal, which
becomes more coordinated, having only one major contractor on the ground.
The main disadvantage is that all service contractors could potentially operate
anywhere in the city, and there is no protected area for each one of them. There
might also be long overlaps between routes of different packages, making the
system a rather complicated one for both the mass transit authority and users.
In the second approach, all routes that fall within a major corridor are com-
bined in one contract and served by a single operator. In this case, there will be
a clearer definition of relatively independent and nonoverlapping service areas,
and the contractor would focus on a certain patronage within the boundaries of
its franchise. Moreover, service in the area would be better coordinated, having
a single operator in charge. A major disadvantage is that every operator may
need to use many stations and will suffer from additional costs when moving the
fleet from the garage to the terminal, and vice versa. In addition, at each termi-
nal there will be more than one service contractor, and the service at the station
might become hard to organize and coordinate. In cases where the transit
authority is not capable of successfully managing shared stations, the draw-
backs resulting from the complexity of operations may outweigh the benefits of
joint station operations whereby transfers and fare integration could be more
easily achieved with contractors operating in common terminals.
Assessment of Bid Packages
The third step in the proposed framework comprises the assessment of the
obtained tender packages to ensure their consistency with the objectives of the
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tendering process. Within this task, the different packages need to be appraised
based on a number of parameters to determine which methodology best serves
the objective of increasing the competitive aspect of the tendering process.
Three criteria that may be adopted for such assessment are:
1. required fleet size for tender package,
2. degree of overlap between tender packages, and
3. balance between profitable and noncommercial routes in a tender pack-
age.
The reqnired fleet size typically depends on the one-way route lengths in
the different packages, average running speeds, and average head ways. The
fleet size determines the financial capabilities of the private companies that
could participate in the tender, since larger fleet requirements typically prevent
small operators from bidding for the service. It is, therefore, necessary to gen-
erate fleet requirements that permit operators with the widest range of
resources to enter the bid.
The degree of overlap is a controversial criterion. On one hand, minimum
overlap is required to ensure relatively independent operation, while on the
other hand, more overlap could reflect a better connectivity and more competi-
tion in the network. Finally, each contract should, as much as possible, balance
profitable and losing routes such that each will end up generating revenues (if
possible), in the interest of both the contractors and the transit authority. This
last criterion relates more closely to revenue contracts whereby individual oper-
ators are fully responsible for the financial performance of their package.
It is understood that the decision on whether to go with competitive ten-
dering or not and the subsequent selection of tender packages is typically
undertaken by local transit boards. The boards might need to reorganize the
whole mass transit system, and regulate the operation of other road transport
operators such as minivans, jitneys, and taxis. The presented approach to route
packaging and the corresponding assessment criteria are only prototypical and
may be modified depending on the objectives of the transit authority.
Accordingly, this article proposes a simple example of the technical analysis
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that may be undertaken to assist transit authorities in subdividing their network
for competitive tendering of bus operations. The above described evaluation
matrix is presented in Table I.
Table 1
Evaluation Matrix
,
Assessment Criteria0~•~
u•c, Required Degree of Balance Between Profitable and
.~ Fleet Size Overlaps Noncommercial Lines
0c By terminal"-g
c
.£
:<
• By corridor
~
"
Case Study: Application to Beirut
Tendering the public bus network in Lebanon is a major component ofthe
reform plan proposed by the Lebanese Ministry of Transport (MOT) to orga-
nize the land transport sector in the country. With this plan, the MOT aims at
reducing the serious lack of organization that characterizes the Lebanese pub-
lic transit sector, as well as minimizing the financial burden of its operation.
The scope of the study covers the whole country, but priority is given to major
cities such as Beirut, which is the focus of the following sections (World Bank
1999; Baaj 1999).
Current Public Transport Sedor in Beirut
The mass transit system in the Greater Beirut Area (GBA) currently oper-
ates under complete deregulation. Five different types of mass transit operators
compete to serve the limited patronage, which accounts for only 32 percent of
the daily motorized trips (Baaj 1999). These are the publicly owned Railway and
Public Transport Authority (RPTA), the privately owned Lebanese Commuting
Company (LCe), private minibuses, jitneys, and taxis. These operators provide
a total capacity that exceeds the current demand, which dangerously reduces
their revenues, and leads to a serious drop in the levels of service. In fact, within
GBA, RPTA, and LCC 164 and 185 buses, respectively, operate and these share
the roads with 2,000 minivans and 25,000 jitneys and taxis.
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This large number of transit vehicles operates alongside private passenger
cars to create major congestion problems in the city. Moreover, the quality of
bus service is extremely low, given the poor vehicle maintenance, aggressive
driving patterns that aim at capturing more riders, and absence of a fixed oper-
ating schedule. As a result, costs to the economy are substantial because of the
increased trip times, transport costs, gasoline consumption, and pollution lev-
els. In addition, the bus authority suffers from high annual subsidies that
reached 20.5 billion L.L ($13.7 million) in year 2000, that is a subsidy of 1,400
L.L ($0.93) for every passenger trip, or three times the collected fare (Baaj
1999).
With all these difficulties, a reform plan seems vital for the preservation
of mass transit services in Beirut. The privatization of bus operations under
privileged contracts appears the most appropriate option, as it has proven to
entail efficiency in other cities worldwide, and because the private sector has
shown remarkable capabilities in running a profitable business despite all the
complexity of the Lebanese transit sector. In fact, looking back at the perfor-
mance of RPTA and LCC by the end of 1998, the latter agency generated 28
percent higher revenues, and its cost per bus-krn was less than half that of the
public company. The two companies operate over the same number of daily
hours (12 hours) and collect the same fare (500 L.L or $0.33 per trip) but dif-
fer in the operated routes-RPTA runs 27 lines (some of which are not prof-
itable but should be operated because of social concerns) while LCC runs II
lines (all of which are profitable). Moreover, RPTA owns old and poorly main-
tained large buses, while LCC works with newer medium-size buses that
enable the adoption of shorter headways and accordingly result in higher vehi-
cle-km figures (Baaj 1999). To all this one may add the flexibility of LCC in
recruiting the appropriate number of staff, free from political and labor union
pressures that exist with RPTA. As a result, LCC has performed much better
than RPTA, and private companies in general are expected to perform better
than the public agency, mainly due to the strong political interventions that
inhibit the successful operation of public corporations in Lebanon. Table 2
summarizes the financial performance of both companies in 1998.
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i Table 2,, Performance of RPTA and lee in 1998
RPTA LCC
Fleet size in operation 164 buses 185 buses
Routes in operation 2S' 12'
Yearly ridership 14 million 18 million
Yearly travel distance 10.5 million bus-km 12.8 million bus-km
Yearly revenues 7 billion L.L 9 billion L.L
Yearly costs 20.5 billion L.L 11.6 billion L.L
Cost/bus-km 2,000 L.L nOL.L
Ratio of employees to operational fleet size 3.8 employees per bus 2.4 employees per bus
I * RPT A has currently added two routes and LCC recently merged two of its routes into a single one.
i
Current Bus Network
Currently, RPTA operates 27 lines in GBA and suburbs, 6 of which are
equally served by LeC, which in tum operates a total of Illines. At this stage
of the research described in this article, the proposed framework was applied
to the currently operating routes, without redesigning the whole network in a
way that would better serve the contracting out process. Accordingly, the appli-
cation of the first step in the framework to the Beirut case study simply meant
considering the existing routes. These include 32 lines (see Figure I).
The network can be defined as a radial one, with major peripheral routes
within Beirut. The origin of the lines is not the same, but the trend is that many
routes radiate from Beirut toward the suburbs around the city. Areas served by
the bus network extend to the north, south, and east, reaching cities such as
Jbeil, Broumana, and Aley. There are 13 lines that extend beyond the limits of
municipal Beirut, 12 lines that connect the city of Beirut with the nearest
southern and northern suburbs, while the remaining 7 lines operate within the
limits of the city, with some moving in an east-west direction, and others mov-
mg in the north-south direction.
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No reliable records exist at the transit authority regarding average speeds
and headways for different routes in the network. For this reason, data collect-
ed by engineering students from the American University of Beirut were used
to approximate those values. Based on point checks and ride checks of LCC
routes conducted by the students, operating speeds and head ways on several
bus routes were estimated. Obtained speed valnes ranged from 10 to 20 km/hr
and headways varied between 7 and 15 minutes. As for the other routes where
no information was available, judgment was used to approximate possible
speed and headway values. Clearly, more detailed surveys and data collection
would be required in a more comprehensive study, but as far as this article is
concerned, the values obtained were considered appropriate for demonstrating
the applicability of the proposed framework.
In each package, fleet sizes of the corresponding routes were added up to
roughly estimate the minimum resources that should be provided by the con-
tractor. Four of the groups in the "terminal" approach had close fleet require-
ments ranging from 47 to 69 buses. Only the fifth group, which also had the
longest network, required 80 buses. As for the first, third, fourth, and fifth con-
tracts of the "corridor" approach, the required fleets were extremely close.
ranging from 55 to 59 buses. The second contract, however, necessitates the use
of 80 buses. If the routes within Beirut were combined. their fleet size would
double to exceed 110 buses, diverging by far from the other contracts. All
required fleets in both approaches are relatively large, possibly restraining
small contractors from participating in the tender. Finally, if we were to con-
sider only this criterion, allocating routes by corridor would better serve the
equity concern.
Degree of Overlap. Overlaying the different packages allowed the identi-
fication of portions of routes shared by two or more packages. This indicated
that, when the first approach was used, many areas of overlap exist among all
the contractors, and they practically exist everywhere within the city. Four
major areas of overlap may be identified, with route lengths exceeding 6 km
each. The total length of route overlap is significant, accounting for 55.6 km.
or 15.2 percent of the total network length.
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In the second approach, the length of overlap is significantly reduced,
accounting for a mere 9.6 percent of the total network (35.1 km), with the
longest overlap not exceeding 7 km. In this system, it appears that the three
radial corridors are almost independent from each other, and the main overlaps
exist with the routes within Beirut. Furthermore, if the lines within Beirut are
combined, the overlaps will be further reduced since most of them occur with-
in the boundaries of the city. Although interlining of routes might be beneficial
for passengers in that it allows for competition to exist directly on the road. the
objective of this assessment criterion within the Beirut case study would be to
minimize overlaps between various packages. This decision was adopted in
order to move away from the current situation of the deregulated bus system of
Beirut. whereby the prevailing on-the-road competition has led to aggressive
driving patterns that endanger pedestrian and vehicle movements, and that
cause daily and costly accidents. Clearly, the network generated from the "cor-
ridor" methodology better serves our objective of minimizing the degree of
overlap without completely eliminating it, thus maintaining possibilities for
connectivity and transfer.
Package Profitability. The most crucial aspect of the contracting out
strategy relates to the balance of profitable and noncommercial routes existing
within each package. To perform an effective study, accurate and stable data on
the financial performance of each line are essential. However, with the simple
objective of demonstrating the application of the proposed framework, this
analysis was conducted based on data available from limited surveys as well as
personal knowledge of the operating environment in Beirut.
Surveys conducted recently were useful in determining approximate val-
ues of the number of passengers carried per trip on different bus routes.
Clearly, these values need to be revised to accommodate daily and seasonal
variations. For the routes surveyed, average passenger loads varied between 19
and 60 passengers per bus trip.
Revenue figures were generated from available ridership data and were
translated into revenues per bus-km, Results ranged from 900 L.L ($0.6)/bus-
km to 1,900 1.L ($1.3)/bus-km. These figures are applicable to LCe routes,
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and in the absence of accurate data, existing routes were accordingly divided
into three categories:
1. profitable routes with average revenues of 1250 L.L (SO.83)/bus-km:
2. marginal routes with average revenues of 900 L.L ($0.6)/bus-km; and
3. noncommercial routes with average revenues of 600 L.L (SOA)/bus-
km.
Identifying the revenue level of each route given this categorization was
achieved based on personal judgment, performance measures developed in pre-
vious studies, and the assumption that all routes currently operated by both
companies are profitable by default. For instance, routes serving densely pop-
ulated areas with low-income levels were considered profitable. This assump-
tion is supported by the relatively high cost-recovery measures previously
characterizing such lines. Other lines that in the past had average cost recovery
were characterized as being marginal. Finally, noncommercial routes were
those serving either less populated regions or high-income residential blocks
(Bassil 1993; Kaysi and Bassil 1995).
As for the cost, given that Lee and RPTA had average costs of 920
L.L/bus-km and 2,000 L.L/bus-km in 1998 (Table 2), an average cost of 1.000
L.L ($0.7)/bus-km was attributed to all the lines, assuming that private sector
companies would achieve cost figures comparable to those of Lee.
Next, net revenues of routes in every package are summed to estimate
their financial profitability. For packages in the first approach, profitability lev-
els were not consistent, with two losing packages and three profitable ones.
With this approach, there is a high need for cross-subsidy between different
packages, and the subsidy will be essentially taken from the highly profitable
Hamra package. As for the packages in the second approach, their net revenues
seem more consistent with two contractors making a moderate return, two con-
tractors achieving a higher net revenue, and only one group losing, but at a lim-
ited rate. This last approach seems to better serve the equity concern, especial-
ly that no package is losing or profiting excessively. Table 3 summarizes the
results of the complete package assessment.
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Table 3
Evaluation Matrix
:
I
Required Degree a! Net Revenues
Fleet Overlap (LL / bus-Ian)
I
Charles Helou 51 -200
Mathaf 61 540
Allocation 55.6 Ian
Dora 47 -555
by Endpoint (15.2%)
Hamra 69 3260
, Saint Georges 80 361,
I
Northern Corridor 59 650
Southern Corridor 80 1031
Allocation 35.1 Ian
Eastern Corridor 59 -430
f by Corridor (9.6%)
N-S Routes Within Beirut 55 630
E-W Routes Within Beirut 55 1525
Conclusions and Further Research
This article addressed the issue of privatization of mass transit systems.
Several approaches were discussed, including public and private monopolies,
deregulation, regulated competition, and contracting out strategies. More focus
was given to this last arrangement, and a brief description of the contract for-
mat was also specified.
Based on international experience in competitive tendering, a flexible
framework for allocating bus routes into tendered packages was defined and
applied to the city of Beirut. The methodology consisted of grouping routes
either by a common terminal or by the shared corridor they serve. The obtained
packages were then assessed based on three criteria relating to fleet size,
degree of overlap, and financial profitability. This assessment task should lead
to a preliminary conclusion as to the preferred basis for route packaging based
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on the evaluation criteria. In the case study, the second methodology is recom-
mended because it best served the defined objectives.
Several assumptions and simplifications were undertaken to complete the
case study application of the proposed framework. For instance, no network
design was performed, and the proposed framework was applied to already
existing routes. It is, however, possible to devise different network design pro-
cedures that best suit the packaging context, and this could fonn the basis of
additional research in the field. Moreover, while the available data were not
very accurate, they demonstrated application of the proposed framework. More
work is required in data collection and validation, especially as far as ridership
and financial information are concerned. Finally, the assessment criteria
applied to the case study are only prototypical, and modifications could be
introduced to the evaluation matrix depending on the specific transit systems
components and objectives. For instance, issues of fare integration and trans-
fers, which were not addressed in this article, could also be included in the
evaluation matrix.
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